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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




MARY AVALON KLEIN, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 13994 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of this Reply Brief is to respond to 
and answer certain issues discussed by the Defendant-Respondent 
in her Brief, to aid in the determination of this matter, if, 
for any reason, the Plaintiff's formal acceptance of the Defen-
dant's offer of settlement, which appears at the conclusion 




THE DEFENDANT'S ANALYSIS OF THE POSTURE OF THIS CASE 
ON APPEAL IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AUTHORITIES OR BY REASON AND 
IS IN ERROR. 
The Defendant's Brief contends that if the stipu-
lated Judgment of December 18, 1974 is set aside, the Judgment Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of November 11, 1974 should be considered reinstated. 
It is the Plaintifffs contention that the Judgment 
of November 11, 1974 was merged into the Judgment of December 
18, 1974 (see cases cited at page 18 of Plaintiff's original 
Brief) and, therefore, that if the Judgment of December 18, 
1974 is set aside, there will be no Judgment outstanding. It 
follows that this case will, technically, be in an interlocutory 
posture before this Court, but eligible for review under the 
doctrine of Schurtz v. Thorley, 90 Utah 381, 61 P.2d 1262 
(1936). The Defendant cites no authorities and offers no 
reasoning to the contrary. But should the Judgment of November 
11, 1974, not be found to have merged into the Judgment of 
December 18, 1974, the Defendant cites no line of reasoning 
and no authority indicating that the Plaintiff would not be 
restored to his position prior to the settlement proceedings 
of December 9, 1974, and why the hearing of his Objections 
to Judgment of November 11, 1974 should not be resumed and 
completed. 
POINT II 
THE STATEMENT OF FACTS IN DEFENDANT'S BRIEF CONTAINS 
NUMEROUS ERRORS OF FACT, CONSISTENTLY DISTORTS THE FACTS AND 
DISCUSSES THE ISSUE OF FAULT EXTENSIVELY DESPITE ITS BEING 
EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT FROM CONSIDERATION IN THIS MODIFICA-
TION PROCEEDING. THE PLAINTIFF MUST THEREFORE REPLY TO AND 
CORRECT DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
This marriage was entered into in 1953 and was termi-
nated in 1972. It was the first marriage for the Plaintiff 
and the second for the Defendant. At the time of the divorce, 
-2-
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the Plaintiff was 50 and the Defendant was 48. The Plaintiff 
entered into this marriage largely out of sense of moral obli-
gation (Record 207). It has been an emotionally barren union, 
characterized by separate beds and several periods of separa-
tion (Record 206). 
The Plaintiff is self-educated in his trade as a land 
developer. The Defendant describes the Plaintiff as "intel-
ligent" and "articulate" but this is no less true of the Defen-
dant. She is a strong-willed, domineering (Record 208, 211), 
and articulate woman (Record 211). It is stated in the Defen-
dant^ Brief that the Plaintiff regards himself as an "academic" 
and his friends as "semi-educated", citing testimony at page 
210 of the Record. The testimony which the Defendant cites 
is actually to the opposite effect. The Plaintiff testifies, 
at page 210: 
My interests and friends range in a semi-educated 
level. I think, by (the Defendant's) laughing, she 
doesn1t feel comfortable in this situation, or, at 
least, it is so indicated. So the friends we have 
made have been the friends of her selection; . . ." 
(Emphasis Added.) 
In fact, the Defendants deprecation of the Plaintifffs educa-
tional background and manner of expression has been a major 
cause of the failure of the marriage. (Record 207). 
Although the Defendant alleges poor health, there 
have been no findings to that effect in the original Decree of 
Divorce or the subsequent modification thereof. 
The Defendants Brief states: 
During the marriage, the parties lived in rather 
stylish fashion: a $100,000 home and a membership 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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at Willow Creek, a twin-engine plane and several trips 
a year to Palm Springs, Las Vegas, Aspen and California; 
entertaining and eating out; Lincoln Continentals; 
two or three trips a year to California, Phoenix, 
Catalina (T 1381, 1382 and 1493) and the Appellant 
enjoyed the luxury of gambling losses (T 1492), 
The picture of luxury thus painted by the Defendant 
is utterly false. The facts are that the home and the Willow 
Creek membership, which now belong to the Defendant, were the 
only luxuries regularly enjoyed by the parties. The hard evi-
dence of the actual standard of living enjoyed by the parties, 
evidence which the Defendant has nowhere disputed, is that the 
living expenses of the Klein household were strictly confined 
to one $350 monthly house payment and one twice-monthly check 
for $175 given the Defendant from which the remaining living 
expenses were met. (Record 1484.) The remaining portion of 
the Plaintiff1s income, which his income tax returns reveal 
averaged $20,600 per year for-the five (5) years prior to the 
modification proceedings, was applied to the purchase money 
debt on the business assets of the marital estate. (Record 
272-83.) 
The Defendant's Brief mentions Lincoln Continentals 
and a twin-engine plane, clearly implying that these were 
marital assets of the parties and an integral part of their 
life-style. The parties operated two (2) Lincoln Continentals 
over the 19 year course of the marriage, the last one of which 
was still in use after 140,000 miles. At the time of the divorce, 
a 1966 Chevrolet registering 120,000 miles was found to be 
the parties1 only personal car (Record 168). The twin-engine 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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should not be overlooked. 
The parties have three (3) sons, aged 15, 19 and 21. 
The oldest is presently serving a mission for the L.D.S. Church. 
Only the youngest is presently living with the Defendant. An 
important cause of the divorce was the Plaintiff's feeling of 
powerlessness in the upbringing of his sons and an important 
reason for the Plaintiff remarrying since the Divorce Decree 
is to provide a family base for those of his sons who choose 
to live with him and follow his guidance. Foremost in the Plain-
tiff's mind in pursuing this appeal, though the percentages 
may be against him, is to preserve an opportunity for him to 
bring his sons up in his business, which opportunity the Plain-
tiff feels he will lose if the Judgment of the trial court is 
sustained and the Plaintiff is forced to meet the crushing debt 
burden left upon him by that Judgment by selling his business 
properties at distress prices. 
The Plaintiff's monthly income of $1,436 is in the 
form of salary from the corporate complex in which he is a 
minority stockholder. His marital obligations, together with 
his business debts, far exceed his income. The trial court's 
Judgment leaves the Plaintiff with the following monthly expenses 
(Record 418): 
A. Alimony § Child Support $600.00 
B. Mortgage on home with taxes and 
insurance 358.00 
C. Medical Expenses (for children) 100.00 
D. Interest occurring on business 
related indebtedness with no Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-g nerated OCR, may contain errors.
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Southern Utah, whose value can only be realized by gradual 
pay-as-you-go development over the long-term. 
Contrast the Plaintiff's financial plight with the 
Defendant's financial condition. The Defendant's Brief opines: 
Since the divorce, the Respondent has lived 
poorly. She can't afford to take vacations; she can 
no longer entertain; she can no longer drive a Lincoln. 
She and the children cannot afford to go to shows 
together as a family (T 1382, 1383). She has attempted 
to supplement her income and works many hours a day 
\ and holds open houses on listed properties on Saturdays 
and Sundays (T 1383). She has spent hours at the job 
but has earned very little money (T 1384). 
The Defendant's own Affidavit shows her monthly income 
as follows: 
A. Gross Alimony and Child Support $600.00 
B. Earnings from her employment 
as a real estate agent, a sum 
averaging approximately $500 
per month 500.00 
C. House payment being paid by 
the Plaintiff 358.00 
D. Country Club Dues 47.00 
E. Health and Accident Insurance 
for children - amount unknown 
DEFENDANT'S TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME $1,505.00 
If the Defendant has lived poorly, in her $100,000 
home, with her country club membership and $1,500 per month 
income, the responsibility for her "poor" living standard, her 
inability to entertain, to drive a Lincoln, to take the family 
to shows, etCo is hers alone. Some light can be shed on the 
cause of her "poor living" by examining her Affidavit of expenses 
« K « 
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asset of the marital estate, all or part of the Seegmiller 
property, appraised at $416,000 by"the Defendant, must be excluded 
from the marital estate on the ground that a vested interest 
in it was not acquired until after a Memorandum Decision of 
Divorce had been rendered adopting a proposed division of the 
marital property. 
It is also asserted in Point II of the Plaintiff's 
original Brief, at page 34, that the speculative real properties 
now held by the parties under low-equity installment purchase 
contracts should be considered to be inventory without which 
the Plaintiff cannot practice his trade as a land developer 
and, as such, are properly classified as business inventory rather 
than marital assets. The original Decree of Divorce which assigne 
nominal values to these properties and awarded them to the Plain-
tiff was based on this reasoning. The original Decree reserved 
limited jurisdiction to modify the Decree if the concept of 
treating the speculative properties as business, inventory rather 
than marital assets should result in f,serious financial distressM 
to either party (982 Record at 1010-11, 562 Record at 663-64 
and 665). 
Instead of directly stating the holding of this Court 
in
 Klein v. Klein, 30 Utah2d 1, 511 P.2d 1284 (1973), the Defen-
dant's brief offers a list of isolated sentences extracted at 
random from that opinion. At the head of that list are the 
following quotations: 
"This seems to be a rather unusual order.11 
flWe think this was highly improper and may 
have been prejudicial.M Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
These quotations are extremely misleading when presented 
out of context in this reckless manner. They were not made in refer-
ence to the original divorce decree or the property division con-
tained therein as the Defendant implies, but to separate issues. 
The first statement refers to a procedural order issued prior to 
trial; the second to a letter received by the trial court. 
(Record 211.) 
The Defendant's Statement of Facts discusses the issue 
of whether the Findings of Fact accompanying the original Decree 
of Judge Faux and those accompanying the modification thereof 
by Judge Taylor are supported by the evidence. In that regard, 
it quotes Finding No. 17 entered November 11, 1974 by Judge 
Taylor: 
The inadequacy and inaccuracy of the original 
and amended Firmlngs, Conclusions and Decree, resulted 
from either the unknowing and unconscious prejudice 
of the initial judge who tried this matter, or as 
a result of his misunderstanding of the facts. The 
error of the trial court who tried this case in the 
first instance" was in failing to properly describe, 
define and itemize substantial portions of the pro-
perty accumulated during the marriage and to assign 
values with respect to said properties, and to include 
said values in a determination of the net marital 
estate. (Emphasis added.) (Record 387.) 
If any findings are unsupported by the evidence, it is Finding 
No. 17. The Findings of November 22, 1972 accompanying the 
original Judgment of Judge Faux describe, define, itemize and 
assign a value to every asset that has been reevaluated in the 
modification hearing before Judge Taylor. Several assets including 
the stock of Ilolidair Lands, Inc., and the Sandberg land purchase 
contract, to which the November 11, 1974 Findings of Judge Taylor 
assign substantial market values, were expressly assigned a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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zero value by the November 11, 1972 Findings of Judge Faux, 
along with the reasons for doing so. For example, Holidair 
Lands, Inc. was. found valueless because the corporation itself 
was found to be a shell. Accordingly, the November 22, 1972 
Findings valued Holidair Lands' underlying assets rather than 
its stock (Finding No. 7(G), November 22, 1972 Findings and 
Conclusions, 163 Record at 166). In those original Findings, 
the Sandberg land purchase contract is assigned a zero value 
because the parties held no equity in the contract. The Plaintiff 
respectfully requests the members of this Court to examine the 
November 22, 1972 Findings of Judge Faux for the purpose of 
finding any significant marital asset that was not described, 
defined, itemized, and assigned a value. It is Finding No. 
17 of the November 11, 1974 Findings of Judge Taylor that 
has been shown to be based on an exceedingly superficial 
reading of the November 22, 1972 Findings, to be inaccurate 
as a result and to be unsupported by the evidence. 
More seriously, Finding No. 17 of Judge Taylor's 
November 11, 1974 Findings and Conclusions expressly finds 
"error" and "unconscious prejudice" by a court of equal 
jurisdiction. Finding No. 17 is by itself reversible error, 
both because it is unsupported by the evidence and because 
it constitutes appellate review of a court of co-equal juris-
diction. 
The Defendant's Brief repeatedly emphasizes that 
the Plaintiff has not made a blanket assertion that the 
marital property values found by the modifying court were 
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unsupported by the evidence. The significance of this observa-
tion escapes the Plaintiff. There are some valuations which 
the Plaintiff does not-contest. Those which the Plaintiff 
contests are expressly challenged on the basis of errors of 
fact and/or law. 
The Defendant's Brief states that the properties 
awarded to the Defendant by the Judgment of November 11, 
1974 have a total value of $743,287.35 and that those awarded 
her by the Judgment of December 18, 1974 have a total value 
of $543,287.35. The Plaintiff's Brief calculates the respec-
tive amounts to be $743,287.35 (Plaintiff's Brief, Appendix 
A-2) and $552,563.35 (Plaintiff's Brief, Appendix A-6). 
The Plaintiff has since discovered that the $73,000 mortgage 
debt allocated to the Defendant has been deducted twice on 
the assets awarded to the Defendant, both by the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant in their Briefs. Therefore, $73,000 should 
be added to the total amount awarded to the Defendant under 
both judgments. The correct total value of property awarded 
the Defendant by the Judgments of November 11, 1974 and 
December 18, 1974 is $816,287.35 and $625,563.35, respectively. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF NEITHER DISCUSSES NOR DISTINGUISHES 
THE NUMEROUS AUTHORITIES CITED IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF SUPPORTING 
THE STRONG MAJORITY RULE FORBIDDING THE ENTRY OF CONSENT JUDGMENTS 
AGAINST A PARTY'S CONSENT. RATHER THAN DEFEND THE MINORITY 
VIEW, THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF CITES AUTHORITIES ADDRESSED TO 
OTHER ISSUES. 
The strong majority rule states that a consent judgment 
is invalid if the consent of o'ne of the parties is lacking at 
-13-
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the time the judgment is entered. (See Freedle v. Moorefield, 
17 N.C. 331, 194 S.E.2d 156 (1973); Farr v. McKinzie, 477 S.W.2d 
672 (Tex.) (1972); Beazley v. Randolph, 409 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.) 
(1966), and numerous additional authorities cited at page 11 of 
Plaintiff's original Brief.) The strong majority rule cited by 
the Plaintiff applies where, as here, a party has made a timely 
application to rescind the settlement agreement prior to the 
entry of Judgment based thereon. Where this set of facts exists, 
the authorities are virtually unanimous in requiring actual consent 
of both parties at the time a consent judgment is entered. The 
Plaintiff, after diligent search, has found no Utah case involving 
this set of facts, and the Defendant's Brief cites none. Rather 
than acknowledge the majority rule or try to distinguish the 
authorities supporting it, the Defendant refers to Johnson v. 
Peoples Finance, 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 P.2d 171 (1954) and Bean 
y. Carlos, 21 Utah 2d 309, 445 P.2d 144 (1918). In both cases, 
there was no petition to rescind a settlement agreement until 
well after it had been breached and well after a judgment had 
been entered. Neither case determines the pow.-r of the trial 
court to enter a consent judgment where a party has made a timely 
petition to rescind the settlement agreement for cause, before 
breach and before the entry of judgment, the only fact situation 
relevant to this case. This distinction is expressly drawn by 
Johnson, supra. While Johnson upholds the power of the trial court 
to enforce a settlement agreement after breach by reducing it 
to judgment, Johnson at the same time states the terms upon which 
rescission of a settlement agreement are normally available: 
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Applications for relief from stipulations 
must be seasonably made. 50 Am; Jur. 613, 614. 
We cannot say as a matter of law that plaintiffs 
were entitled to relief after a period of that 
(9 month) duration, particularly since the record 
does not authoritatively show that the other parties 
to the suit had not acted in reliance upon a stipu-
lation and that the vacating of the stipulation 
would not be unfair to them. In view of the state 
of the record we must affirm the judgment. (2 72 P.2d 
at 173.) (Emphasis added.) 
Johnson, therefore, expressly acknowledges that where there is a 
timely effort to rescind, no detrimental reliance by the opposing 
party and no resulting injustice, rescission of a stipulation 
is available. 
Like Johnson, Bean v. Carlos, supra, is simply another 
case where a motion to rescind a settlement was denied where it 
was made long after its breach and long after the entry of judgment. 
Bean relies completely upon Johnson and therefore preserves the 
distinctions drawn there. 
In summary, the cases cited by the Defendant involve 
applications to vacate stipulated judgments made long after breach 
and long after the entry of judgment. They do not detract in any 
way from a party's right to rescind a stipulated judgment for 
cause where (1) his application is timely, being prior to any 
breach of the settlement and prior to the entry of judgment, 
and (2) the opposing party has not detrimentally relied and 
therefore would suffer no injustice. The Plaintiff's Brief 
demonstrates that his application for rescission satisfies all 
the prerequisites required by the strong majority rule for rescind-
ing a consent to judgment. 
The Defendant's Brief sneers at the possibility that 
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the Plaintiff may not have been acquainted with the terms of 
the settlement agreement, citing the Plaintiff's education, 
intelligence, attendance at the hearings, etc. Nowhere does 
the Defendant explain how the Plaintiff could divine for himself 
those terms of the settlement that were supplied to him only 
in the form of numbers to paragraphs of a prior set of Findings 
and Conclusions which he had never seen and had never been told 
existed. The Plaintiff was required to put together the economic 
and legal puzzle of this extremely complex settlement on the 
spur of the moment with only a handful of the pieces. It should 
be borne in mind that five months had elapsed since the modifi-
cation hearings, that the most significant argument over the 
division of the marital property had been in the form of post-
hearing briefs submitted by counsel and prepared during the Plain-
tiff's absence in St, George. The issues presented during the 
December 6 and 9, 1974 hearings on objections were difficult 
enough for counsel and the trial court to follow, let alone the 
Plaintiff, as a reading of those proceedings will demonstrate. 
Indeed, several complications, apparently not fully understood 
by Plaintiff's own counsel, contributed greatly to the impossible 
nature of the settlement arrived at from the standpoint of the 
Plaintiff's capacity to carry it out. Among those terms were 
the requirement that the Plaintiff's stock in Major Enterprises 
be delivered to the trial court and sold on the event of his 
default, which directly violates the restrictions placed upon 
the transfer of that stock by the legend upon the stock certifi-
cates themselves and the shareholder's agreement received in 
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evidence during the modification hearing. Another such term 
was the lien in favor of the Defendant placed directly upon 
the real property owned by third parties to these divorce pro-
ceedings in their capacity as shareholders of Holidair Lands, 
Inc. Another was the requirement that the Plaintiff pay $50,000 
to the Defendant in such form that it would be taxable to him. 
Had the Plaintiff understood the actual nature of these provisions, 
the Plaintiff would never have consented to a settlement in that 
form. 
The following portion of the transcript demonstrates 
that the Plaintiff was not acquainted with the bulk of the 
terms of the settlement offer: 
THE COURT: All-right. Mr. Klein, you have 
heard your counsel read into the record, part of 
it by reference to paragraphs. I don't know whether 
you have been able to follow it or not. 
MR. KLEIN: I haven't followed it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand it? 
MR. KLEIN: I am relying on my counsel. At 
this point, I haven't been able to see it. 
The Defendant's brief claims that this passage is ntaken 
out of context" and "related only to one specific matter." 
But the quoted exchange is general by its terms. It comes 
at the end of the settlement process. If this exchange refers 
to only one specific matter, the Defendant is challenged 
to explain what, that matter was. The Plaintiff requests 
that the members of this Court read the above-quoted passage 
for themselves, in context, and decide for themselves whether 
it is anything other than a generalized response to a general 
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and summarizing question put by the trial^court. 
The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff's depres-
sion and disorientation during the settlement proceeding 
is a "self-serving, unsubstantiated and unsupported declara-
tion that is not entitled to credibility." The Court is 
directed to the Affidavit of Steven R. Anderson, Vice-President 
of Valley Bank $ Trust Company, dated January 17, 1975, 
corroborating the Plaintiff's disoriented mental state immedi-
ately after the settlement proceedings0 Plaintiff's Rule 
75 Memorandum of Authorities, item (i), on file with this 
Court. 
The Defendant extended an offer of settlement during 
the hearing of Plaintiff's Objections to Judgment on December 
9, 1974, wherein she offered to give up half of the Seegmiller 
property which she had been awarded by the Judgment of November 
11, 1974, in return for $50,000 in tax free cash payments from 
the Plaintiff. She claims that her offer was motivated by 
nothing more than the benevolence of her character. She goes 
on to accuse the Plaintiff of having accepted her "selfless 
peace offering" in bad faith, intending to extract all possible 
concessions from her before taking an appeal from his settle-
ment. 
This is absurd. The Defendant was prompted to initiate 
a settlement offer only after the court had expressed its mis-
givings about the provision of the November 11, 1974 Judgment 
awarding all of the Seegmiller property to the Defendant and 
all of the corresponding debt to the Plaintiff. As for the 
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Plaintiff accepting her offer in bad faith, with the intent of 
seeking rescission, such an accusation is preposterous. It 
requires one to believe that the Plaintiff arranged to have the 
settlement offer read to him in undecipherable code by the Defen-
dant's counsel just so he could later assert that fact as grounds 
for an appeal. It should be borne in mind that the Defendant 
initiated well over half of the post-trial litigation in this 
matter, that the Plaintiff's business pursuits have all but been 
destroyed by these proceedings, that he has been required to 
finance both sides of most of these proceedings at a time when 
he has been desparately short of cash, and that, as even the 
Plaintiff concedes, the posture of his appeal from the December 
18, 1974 consent Judgment is substantially less favorable than 
it would have been from the Judgment of November 11, 1974. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF FAILS TO GRASP THE NATURE OF THE 
INEQUITY OF THE JUDGMENTS OF NOVEMBER 11, AND DECEMBER 18, 1974, 
WHICH PROMPTS HIS APPEAL. 
The Defendant's Brief relies on the fact that the 
share of property awarded to the Plaintiff appears larger 
than that awarded to the Defendant. In the case of the 
November 11, 1974 Judgment, the division is $931,602.63 to 
Plaintiff and $816,287.35 to Defendant. In the case of the 
December 18, 1974 Judgment, the division is $1,131,602.63 
to Plaintiff and $623,563.35 to Defendant. 
If this estate consisted of cash or anything remotely 
comparable, and if the-Plaintifffs complaint were that the 
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percentage of the estate awarded to the parties is inequitable, 
there would, of course be little ground for taking an appeal 
from such division. Most of the assets of this estate, 
however, are not remotely comparable to cash assets and the 
essence of the Plaintiff's complaint of inequity has little 
to do with the percentages awarded either party. 
The Defendant describes the marital estate as a 
"million dollar empire." The facts are that it is a "million 
dollar empire" only in a hypothetical sense. It is an estate 
that could become a million dollar empire, but only after 
a series of contingent events have occurred, events which 
at this point appear unlikely to happen. 
Due to the numerous conditions precedent to this estate 
becoming a "million dollar empire", if the entire marital estate 
were to be liquidated over a three month period, and federal 
and state income taxes were taken into account, this entire estate 
would yield in the neighborhood of $500,000 cash. The lower 
court judgment is inequitable to both parties because it is 
oblivious to the estatefs precarious grip on its major assets 
and the highly uncertain value of those assets. The remedy to 
this inequity arising from the highly uncertain value of the 
estate is to remove the encumbrances on the estate, make it whole, 
make its business assets viable once again, allow the Defendant 
to participate in it through appropriate adjustments in alimony 
and reserve jurisdiction in order to protect the Defendant's 
right to participate in the yield of the marital estate, should 
the management of the marital estate ever appear to jeopardize 
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that right. 
The inequity of the tri.al court's Judgments appears 
most clearly in the context of a discussion of the contingencies 
upon which the values of the marital assets depend. 
The first contingency that must occur before this 
marital estate becomes a "million dollar empire" is the 
discharge of the purchase money debt in the amount of $157,000 
on the "Seegmiller", ffSandbergM, and "Pershing-Nelson" install-
ment land purchase contracts. If $157,000 in cash is not 
somehow raised from this estate by the end of this year, the 
"Seegmiller", "Sandberg", and "Pershing-Nelson" properties, 
valued by the trial court at roughly $1,112,000, will be lost. 
(See page 30 of Plaintiff's original Brief.) The estate's pre-
carious hold on these three assets can be appreciated when it 
is realized that it holds equity of only $110,000 in these pro-
perties, assigned more than $1,100,000 of value by the trial 
court. 
The Plaintiff's original Brief, at page 30, demonstrates 
that the marital estate has short-term cash requirements of 
$300,000. The prospects that $300,000 in cash can be extracted 
from this estate in the immediate future are slim. The 
only source of cash in this estate is Plaintiff's salary, 
which, as Plaintiff's original Brief has demonstrated, is, 
too small to cover even the monthly interest on the purchase 
money debt. Since the estate has only $110,000 in equity 
in the MSeegmillerff, nSandbergM, and MPershing-Nelsonff pro-
perties, and their value is so speculative, lenders will 
not accent them as collateral. (Vl&cnrd 466-67.1 A<; r>vr>1 m'noH 
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in Plaintiff's original brief at pages 23-24, these properties 
are tracts of raw desert, far from other built-up areas. 
Real value will be imparted to them only after massive initial 
investment in exploring for water, constructing utility 
systems and providing urban services. Without this initial 
investment, any effort to raise cash by selling these proper-
ties a few acres at a time would yield a relative pittance. 
The money needed to retire the purchase money debt 
encumbering the bulk of this estate cannot come from this 
estate's 49% interest in the stock of three land development 
corporations--Major Enterprises, Award Homes and Dynamic 
Corporation--valued at an incredible $800,000 by the trial 
court. These are all minority blocks of stock in closely 
held corporations restricted from public sale by written share-
holders1 agreements. The only buyer for this stock is the 50% 
shareholder, Verl O'Brien, who is entirely without available 
funds to purchase additional investments of any kind. (Record 
422-24, 1568-72.) 
There is no asset within this estate that can be 
readily liquidated to yield the approximate $300,000 that, as 
is explained at pages 30-31 of Plaintiff's Brief, is needed 
in the short run to preserve its speculative business assets. 
Under the present Judgment of the trial court, the only way 
to extract this amount of ready cash from this estate is to liqui 
date roughly half of its business assets at distress prices in 
order to preserve the other. 
As Plaintiff's original Brief points out, there can 
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be no argument that this sacrifice is necessary to meet the 
immediate needs of the Defendant. Her estimated alimony and 
support payments of $1,500 per month are more than double the 
living expenses of the entire Klein household prior to the divorce. 
Plaintiff's original brief points out, as well, that there is 
a clearly feasible way to avoid this major sacrifice of the 
marital estate. The Plaintiff's ability and long experience 
as a land developer, the success of the land development cor-
porations he founded, and, in particular, his experience and 
understanding of the real estate market in the St. George area 
demonstrate that, if given the chance, he could successfully 
develop the marital estate's speculative real property and real-
ize, for the benefit of both parties, their full potential values. 
But the lower court Judgments, by encumbering and frag-
menting these properties, have shackled and will continue to 
shackle the Plaintiff in his efforts to develop them and realize 
their full potential valueG If the encumbrances upon these 
properties were removed, if they were once again made whole and 
their value as collateral restored, the Plaintiff could get their 
development underway0 The benefits of such development could 
accrue to both parties by making appropriate adjustments of the 
alimony of the Defendant as the development progressed. Juris-
diction could be retained, as it was in the original Decree, 
to be invoked by the Defendant if these assets should ever be 
managed in such a way as to jeopardize the Defendant's opportunity 
to benefit in the yield therefrom. Such a property division would 
prevent the forced liquidation of a major part of the marital 
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estate at prices far below its potential value and thereby pre-
vent manifest injustice to both parties. Property divisions 
of this kind are historically sanctioned and have proven to be 
a highly satisfactory method of solving the dilemma of how to 
equitably divide marital property of contingent value, Wooley 
v. Wooley, 113 Utah 391, 195 P.2d 743 (1948); Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 
77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214 (1930). The Defendant herself has acknowl-
edged the major contingencies to which the marital properties 
are subject in her Memorandum and Proposal of the Defendant (Record 
338-39). There, as a remedy for such uncertainty, she proposed 
a property division in the form of a schedule of cash payments 
to herself, which is the substantial equivalent of a property 
division cast in the form of alimony. 
Another major uncertainty, upon which the "million 
dollar" values depend is the lawsuit which must be won in order 
to obtain title to the Sandberg property, valued by the trial 
court at $511,000. The trial court's Finding No. 19 of its 
Findings and Conclusions of November 11, 1974 declares that there 
is "risk and a possibility, but not a probability, that the 
Sandberg acreage and the resulting values may be lost." But 
nowhere in the record does any witness make such a contention, 
and the record is entirely devoid of any evidence bearing on 
the probability that the Sandberg lawsuit will be won or lost. 
As the trial court's Judgment is framed, the marital 
property is subjected to an additional major contingency whereby 
the failure to secure certain assets of the marital estate 
will have a dominoe effect, causing the whole estate to be 
-.24i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lost. If the Plaintiff cannot raise $230,000 in cash by the 
end of this year, he will be unable to make the payment on 
the Seegmiller mortgage and the initial payment on the $50,000 
owed to the Defendant as required by the trial court Judgment, and 
still meet the mortgage payments on the remainder of the marital 
estate. In that event, his stock in Major Enterprises is to 
be sold by the Court and applied to these obligations. Such 
a sale would yield virtually nothing on the open market and 
this purportedly $543,000 asset would be sacrificed for nothing. 
If the Plaintiff is deprived of his stock in this manner, his 
salary from Major Enterprises, from which the debt on the entire 
estate is serviced, would be jeopardized. Should this occur, 
and it is likely to occur unless the present Judgment is modified, 
the entire marital estate, with the possible exception of the 
St. George Sandpiper apartment complex, would be pulled under. 
The Defendant's Brief purports to put the prospect of the collapse 
of the marital estate flin perspectiveM by observing that the 
only difference between the financial obligations imposed upon 
the Plaintiff by the Judgment of December 18, 1974 as opposed 
to the Judgment of November 11, 1974 is the duty to pay the 
Plaintiff cash installments of $50,000. This observation 
is not even addressed to the Plaintiff's argument. The 
Plaintiff has never contended that the later Judgment was . • 
more likely than the earlier Judgment to precipitate the 
collapse of the marital estate. The problem of raising approxi-
mately $300,000 needed in the short run to preserve the 
marital assets (Plaintiff's Brief, pages 30-31) and the problem 
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of the encumbrance and fragmentation of the marital properties 
now standing in the way of their preservation, are common 
to both Judgments. Understandably, the Defendant's Brief 
studiously avoids a discussion of this point raised in the 
Plaintiff's original brief. 
The Defendant's Brief argues that no inequity would 
result from the lower court's Judgment since the estate's high 
risk assets are evenly distributed and their loss would be borne 
equally by the parties. The Defendant, at page 28 of her Brief, 
itemizes what she considers to be the risk assets awarded to 
the respective parties as follows: 
AWARD OF SPECULATIVE PROPERTIES: 
TO APPELLANT: 
A. Holidair Lands stock and contract 
receivable on Sandberg and Nelson 
properties, less $252,000.00 con-
tingent payable to Respondent: $448,762.50 
B. 600 acres of Seegmiller land: $208,000.00 
TOTAL SPECULATIVE TO APPELLANT: ' $656,762,50 
'...,;. , TOTAL SPECULATIVE TO RESPONDENT: 
A. Contingent Holidair Land contract $252,000.00 
B. 600 acres of Seegmiller property: $208,000.00 
TOTAL SPECULATIVE TO RESPONDENT: $460,000,00 
She itemizes at page 27 of the Brief what she considers to 
be the safe assets awarded to respective parties as follows: 
TO APPELLANT; 
A. All of the stock in Major Enter-
prises and the other corporations, 
with net values in excess of: $800,000.00 
B. The Appellant's profit sharing 
funds in Major Enterprises, with 
a value of: $ 47,850.00 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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C. The 3.1 acres of unimproved ground 
in downtown St. George, with a 
value of: $ 60,000,00 
TOTAL NON-SPECULATIVE PROPERTIES 
. AWARDED TO APPELLANT $907,850.00 
TO RESPONDENT: 
D. The family resident in Salt Lake 
City, with a value of: $103,000.00 
E. Stock in Intermountain Land $ 
Development Corporation (liquida-
ted by Respondent): $ 7,000.00 
F. Receivable from Appellant: $ 50,000.00 
G. The fourteen apartments in St. 
George, with a net value of: $ 33,000,00 
TOTAL NON-SPECULATIVE PROPERTIES 
AWARDED TO RESPONDENT: $193,000.00 
From this itemization the Defendant concludes that if the risk 
assets are lost, both parties lose equally. This analysis 
is incomplete, to put it mildly. If certain risk assets, namely 
the Seegmiller property, are lost, it is true they are lost 
to both. But the Defendant neglects to mention that her share 
in that property is secured by the Plaintiff's nnon-speculativeM 
assets, namely Plaintiffrs $543,000 worth of Major Enterprises 
stock. Under the present Judgment, the Plaintiff's hold on 
both his risk and his safe assets is exceedingly precarious. 
If the Seegmiller property is lost, the Plaintiff loses it and 
his corporate stock, and when that is lost he has nothing with 
which to service the debt on his remaining assets. As a result, 
if the Seegmiller property is lost, the Plaintiff loses every-
thing else as well. The Defendant's contention that the risk 
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inherent in this marital estate is equally and equitably dis-
tributed between the parties is baseless. 
The Defendants Brief denies that the lower court 
Judgment perpetuates a business partnership after the marital 
partnership has been dissolved. This is not the case. For 
example, the 3.1 acres of land surrounding the St. George Sand-
piper apartments have been awarded to the Plaintiff, while the 
apartments themselves standing in the center of this acreage 
have been awarded to the Defendant. Under these circumstances, 
the Plaintiff cannot develop his lands, as a practical matter, 
without the Defendant's approval. Likewise, the Plaintiff and 
Defendant are made abutting landowners in the Seegmiller property 
and, as a practical matter, these properties, with respect to 
roads, water, utilities and services, will have to be developed 
cooperatively or not at all. This is another inequity which 
a property division in the form of alimony to the Defendant 
would remedy. 
The Plaintifffs partial loss of the marital estate's 
developable lands and with it his opportunity to practice his 
trade as a land developer is a further inequity of the lower 
court Judgments. Finding No. 18 of the Findings and Conclusions 
of November 11, 1974 states: 
The Plaintiff, ROBERT D. KLEIN, has the train-
ing, ability, experience, knowledge and know-how 
to earn and continue to earn and accumulate sub-
stantial amounts of assets while the Defendant, 
MARY AVALON KLEIN, does not. 
Finding No. 18 fails to recognize that the Plaintiff's earning 
ability thus described exists only to the extent that the 
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developable lands of the marital estate remain at his disposal. 
To the extent that the marital estate's developable lands are 
lost to the Plaintiff, his earning ability and his opportunity 
to practice his trade are lost. A further inequity of both 
lower court Judgments is that they require the Defendant to 
manage or dispose of substantial real property, which will place 
a substantial burden on the Defendant who is without business 
experience. The loss to the Plaintiff and the burden on the 
Defendant thus described are additional inequities which a pro-
perty division in the form of alimony to the Defendant would 
remedy. 
POINT V 
THERE ARE THREE PLAIN, CLEAR AND UNAVOIDABLE PRERE-
QUISITES TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT TO FURTHER HEAR 
THIS CASE. THERE IS A CONSPICUOUS SILENCE IN DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
AS TO WHETHER THOSE PREREQUISITES HAVE BEEN MET. 
Plaintiff's original Brief points out that the 
Defendant appealed from the original Decree of Divorce in 
this matter, which Decree was affirmed by this Court. Klein 
v. Klein, 30 Utah2d 1, 511 P.2d 1284 (1973). Jurisdiction 
to rehear this case is nowhere purported to be based on Sec. 
30-3-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), which provides: 
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction 
to make such subsequent changes or new orders with 
respect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their 
support and maintenance, or the distribution of 
the property as shall be reasonable and necessary. 
To base a reexamination of alimony or property on 
this section requires a showing of substantially changed 
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circumstances. Under no conditions may this prerequisite 
to invoking this jurisdictional statute be dispensed with, 
Cody v, Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P.952 (1916); Anderson v. Anderson, 
13 Utah2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962) ; Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 
216, 198 P.2d 233 (1948); Gale v. Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 
P.2d 986 (1953); Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47 P.2d 894 
(1935); Badger v, Badger, 69 Utah 293, 254 P. 784; Chaffee v. 
Chaffee, 63 Utah 261, 225 P. 76; Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah 
261, 236 P. 457 18 A.L.R.2d 10. The Defendant has nowhere 
asserted substantially changed circumstances since the original 
Decree, and the modifying court found none. Jurisdiction 
to rehear this case therefore rests exclusively on the terms 
of the original Decree of Divorce dated November 22, 1972, 
which reserved limited jurisdiction to be invoked upon the 
following conditions: 
The court further retains limited jurisdiction 
if within one year either party proves to be suffer-
ing serious financial distress because of the decree 
to be based on this decision and the ensuing 
developments arising therefrom not capable of 
evaluation and effect at this time the court will 
review its rulings and determine whether modifi-
cations should be made. (Emphasis added.) 
By the terms of the reservation, the following 
three prerequisites to jurisdiction are clear, plain and 
unavoidable: 
1) that serious financial distress be suffered, 
2) due to ensuing developments 
3) not capable of evaluation at the time 
of trial. 
This reservation was interpreted by this Court in Klein 
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v. Klein, supra, and by Judge Sawaya in his Order of December 
7, 1973, (Record 236.) Neither interpretation dispenses 
in any way with these three jurisdictional prerequisites. 
Contrary to the assumption in Defendant's Brief, 
the Order of Judge Sawaya emphatically did not grant juris-
diction to modify the original Decree, It authorized a 
hearing of economic matters for the purpose of determining 
whether there were grounds for invoking the limited juris-
diction reserved in the original Decree and went no further. 
Therefore, jurisdiction to modify the original Decree is based 
solely upon Judge Taylor's Findings and Conclusions of November 
11, 1974. 
As Plaintiff's original Brief points out, beginning 
at page 43, the Findings and Conclusions of November 11, 
1974, are conclusory and unsupportable by the evidence with 
regard to the first jurisdictional prerequisite—the Defen-
dant's Tfserious financial distress.M They contain a mere 
conclusion, in Finding No. 7, that the Defendant has suffered 
"serious financial distress.M If this is regarded as a finding 
rather than a mere conclusion, it is unsupported by the evidence. 
The unrebutted evidence in this case is that the Defendant's 
monthly income since the divorce is twice the living allowance 
of the entire Klein household prior to the divorce. The fact 
that the Defendant was able to squander this doubled income 
and still run up approximately $24,000 in indebtedness in one 
and one-half years' time (See Finding No. 6, Findings and Con-
clusions of November 11, 1974), cannot rationally be considered 
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"serious financial distress" within the meaning of the lower 
courtfs reservation. 
As the Plaintiff's original Brief at page 44 notes, 
the Findings and Conclusions of November 11, 1974 contain no 
finding or conclusion that even acknowledges, let alone satis-
fies, the second and third prerequisites to the jurisdiction 
of the modifying court — that the Defendant's "serious financial 
distress'1 must result from nensuing developments" "not capable 
of evaluation at the time of trial." If these second and third 
jurisdictional requirements are disregarded, there is nothing 
to differentiate the limited jurisdiction reserved in the original 
decree from a complete new trial. The modifying court itself 
conceded that if these limitations could not be disregarded, 
that it had jurisdiction to reexamine only the contingent assets 
of the marital estate that could not be evaluated at the time 
of the original trial, (Record 1568.) Unless the Defendant's 
theory is correct, that "this case is before this (modifying) 
Court now in the same posture as it would be if there had not 
been any initial decree . . ." (Record 1081), this Court must 
remand this cause to a trial court with instructions that the 
estate's assets which are not contingent and were fully capable 
of being evaluated at the time of trial, such as the corporate 
stock and the St. George Sandpiper properties, must be excluded 
from its deliberations. 
The Plaintifffs original Brief has shown that the 
lower courtfs jurisdiction to modify the original Decree of 
Divorce rests exclusively upon the terms of the reservation 
- T C O -
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of jurisdiction in the original Decree. The Findings and Con-
clusions of the lower court must, and do not, show that the 
Defendant has satisfied the three-fold limitation upon jurisdic-
tion specified therein. For obvious reasons, the Defendant's 
Brief avoids all discussion of the unmet terms of that reservation. 
POINT VI 
THE CONTENTION IN DEFENDANT'S BRIEF THAT THE SEEG-
MILLER OPTION WAS EXERCISED WITH THE JOINT ASSETS OF THE PARTIES 
IS PLAINLY IN ERROR. 
The Defendant's Brief fails to discuss or distinguish 
the Plaintiff's authorities which establish the rule that upon 
divorce, parties are not entitled to share in marital assets 
unless their joint efforts have aided in the accumulation of 
those assets. As Plaintiff's original Brief states, the Seeg-
miller option was originally an option due to expire on May 
31, 1972. The Defendant was asked to co-sign the note and 
mortgage necessary to raise the $37,000 necessary to exercise 
the option. The Defendant refused. On May 18, 1972, a Memorandum 
Decision of Divorce was entered adopting a proposed property 
division in which the Seegmiller property was awarded to the 
Plaintiff. On May 25, 1972, solely on the security of his 
share of the marital estate, the Plaintiff borrowed the money 
required to exercise the option. As in the cases cited 
at page 46 of Plaintiff's original Brief, the purchase money 
was raised during the period when the Plaintiff received 
no contribution of any kind, domestic or economic, from the 
Defendant. The claim,in Defendant's Brief that the option 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
w a s exercfised with the joint assets of the parties is clearly 
false. The Defendant did not in any way share the consider-
able personal financial risk incurred by the Plaintiff in 
order to exercise the option. But after refusing to share 
in the risk of acquiring the Seegmiller property, the Defen-
dant will participate fully in the benefits of the Plaintiff's 
efforts, having been awarded,under the modifying Judgments 
heretofore entered by the trial court, the beneficial interest 
in the Seegmiller property but none of the risks or debts. 
The Plaintiff submits that a proper application of the ,!joint 
efforts" doctrine, as well as general equitable principles, 
require that the Seegmiller property be excluded in whole or 
in part from the divisible marital estate. 
If the Seegmiller property were excluded from the dis 
tributable marital estate and thereby placed at the disposal of 
the Plaintiff, the major inequities of which the Plaintiff com-
plains- -the encumbering and fragmenting of the marital estate 
which now threatens its viability—would be largely remedied. 
POINT VII 
THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF WRONGLY ASSERTS THAT THE ERROR 
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN FAILING TO VALUE THE MARITAL ASSETS AS 
OF THE DATE OF TRIAL CAUSED NO SIGNIFICANT VARIATION IN 
THE PROPERTIES AWARDED TO THE PARTIES. 
Plaintiff's original Brief cites the rule, with 
supporting authorities, that the marital property must be 
evaluated at the time of trial. The rule is so well settled 
that the Defendant's Brief does not attempt to challenge 
it. Having, as a practical matter, conceded this error on 
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the part of the trial court, the Defendant contends that 
it would have made no difference if the proper valuation date 
had been used. One of the estatefs major assets, the Seeg-
miller property, valued by the trial court at $416,000, existe 
in the marital estate only as an option until after the trial 
and the proposed division of property had been adopted. There 
after, the option was exercised and the property acquired by 
the Plaintiff at substantial personal financial risk. If the 
correct valuation date had been adhered to by the modifying 
court, only the Seegmiller option, not the substantially more 
valuable Seegmiller property itself, would have been valued 
and divided by the trial court. 
POINT VIII 
THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF LARGELY EVADES DISCUSSION OF 
THE ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW UPON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT BASED 
ITS VALUATION OF CERTAIN MARITAL ASSETS. 
The Plaintiff's contracts receivable from Holidair 
Lands calls for payments totaling $504,000 due on or before 
January 31, 1986. The Plaintiff's Brief contends that the 
law requires contracts receivable to be valued according 
to the price it would currently bring on the contracts receiv-
able market. That this is required by law is not disputed 
by the Defendant. The Plaintiff's contract receivable bears 
a low rate of interest. If discounted to the present to 
reflect the current prime interest rate, the present value 
of the $504,000 receivable would be $328,800. If discounted 
to reflect the current-competitive interest rate in the 
-1K~ 
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contract receivables market, the present value of the $504,000 
receivable is $133,100. If discounted to reflect the actual 
interest rate or actual return on investment that investors 
would demand before buying this specific contract receivable, 
the present value of the $504,000 receivable would be almost 
nothing in view of the fact that the obligor, Holidair Lands, 
Inc., is an inactive corporation, generating no income, with 
a total of $26.00 in its bank account and receiving only such 
funds with which a contract receivable might be paid as its 
present stockholders choose to loan to it. 
The Defendant's Brief disputes none of this, but 
replies instead that the true value of the Plaintiff's contract 
receivable is irrelevant since it has not been awarded to the 
Defendant. The approach of Defendant's Brief is interesting. 
It declares on the one hand that whether or not the values of the 
assets awarded to the Plaintiff are accurate is irrelevant to 
the equities of his appeal. It declares on the other hand that 
the lower court Judgments cannot be thought inequitable to the 
Plaintiff because they award him two thirds of the marital assets, 
assuming that they were correctly valued. 
The Plaintiff holds a 49.9% stock interest in three 
land development corporations which he founded--Major Enter-
prises, Inc., Award Homes, Inc. and Dynamic Corporation. His 
stock was not valued by the trial court according to its fair 
market value as_ stock. Instead, it was valued according to 
the value of the underlying assets of these corporations. The 
trial court assigned to this stock a value of approximately 
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$800,000 (Record 379). The Plaintiff's Brief contends that 
the law requires that a non-controlling block of stock in a 
closely held corporation be valued according to that stock's 
fair market value. Accordingly, as the numerous authorities cited 
by Plaintiff's original Brief, beginning at page 52, confirm, the 
value of such stock must be based on the various factors affecting 
its marketability. Principal among them are the transferability 
of stock, the corporation's net earnings, its net worth, the ability 
of the stockholder to liquidate the corporate assets and the market-
ability of those assets upon liquidation of the corporation. As 
noted in Plaintiff's original Brief, the Plaintiff's stock is re- • * 
stricted stock, transferable only to the other shareholders at a 
pre-negotiated or an arbitrated price. The Defendant concedes that 
under these circumstances Verl O'Brien is the only available buyer 
of the Plaintiff's stock. (Page 19 of the Proceedings of December 
6 and 9, 1974.) Verl O'Brien is entirely without funds to purchase 
additional investments of any kind. The net earnings and net worth of 
Major Enterprises has declined rapidly in recent years. Net 
earnings were a minus $46,704.75 for 1974 as compared to a minus 
$10,209.65 for 1973. Current net worth is $124,058 as compared to 
$180,108.12 at the close of 1973. Because the Plaintiff's 49.9% 
stock interest is a non-controlling block, he has no power to 
liquidate. 
It is readily apparent that if the factors which 
influence the market price of closely held corporate stock 
had been applied to-the Plaintiff's stock, as the law requires, the 
-37*" 
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value of that stock would have been reduced to a small fraction 
of that assigned to it by the trial court. 
The Defendant's brief does not contest the rule 
of law that a non-controlling block of closely held stock 
must be appraised according to that stock's fair market value 
rather than its underlying assets. It merely asserts that 
this error of the trial court is irrelevant. It states at 
page 38: 
The simple facts are that Fifty percent (50%) 
of the (Major Enterprises') stock is owned by one 
Verl O'Brien and the other Fifty percent (50%) of 
the stock stands in the name of the Appellant. This 
creates an absolute deadlock situation with respect 
to the management of the corporation. Either party 
may demand a liquidation of the corporate assets at 
any time (Sec. 16-10-92, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as Amended). The continuation of the corporate business 
\ in corporate form is conditioned upon the continuing 
agreement and acquiescence of both Mr. O'Brien and 
the Appellant. Under the circumstances, the corporate 
stock as such has no market value as a stock (sic). 
The flsimple fact" cited by the Defendant is manufac-
tured out of thin air. The Defendant is fully aware that 
the "simple facts" are otherwise. 
The record is replete with both testimony and documentary 
evidence that the Plaintiff owns a minority interest in the 
stock of the corporate complex. The Plaintiff testified 
at the original trial before Judge Faux, that he owns 49.9% of 
the stock of the corporate complex. (Record 588-604). The 
Plaintiff's minority stock interest in the corporate complex 
is disclosed at ten other locations in the transcript of 
the original trial, which transcript the Defendant's counsel 
has, according to his own testimony, carefully and thoroughly 
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read. Exhibits 38-P, 39-P and 40-P, introduced into evidence 
during the modification hearings of July, 1974, are shareholder 
agreements revealing the 49.9% ownership of the Plaintiff in the 
stock of the corporate complex. Exhibit 40-P, for example, shows 
the Plaintiff to own 649, Leo Jardine 1, and Verl O'Brien 650 
of the 1,300 outstanding shares of Major Enterprises. While on 
the stand, the Plaintiff was asked by the Defendant's counsel 
if he did not "as a practical matter11 hold a Fifty percent (50%) 
interest in Major Enterprises, which the Plaintiff denied. (Record 
1502). 
There were two specific purposes for confining the 
Plaintiff to a minority percentage of the corporate complex 
stock and awarding one share to Leo Jardine, as evidenced in 
Exhibit 38 through 40-D: to allow the Plaintiff to qualify 
as minority shareholder so that he would be entitled to capital 
gain treatment under Section 302 of the Internal Revenue Code 
upon liquidation of his shares, and to allow Mr. Jardine to 
serve as the independent third member of the Board of Directors 
whose purpose, among others, was, and is, to break any deadlock 
in the management of the corporation that might arise. Mr. 
Jardiners share of stock in the corporate complex may not be 
transferred to the other shareholders without giving first the 
corporation, and then all other shareholders, a right of first 
refusal under the shareholder agreements referred to above. 
It is readily apparent that the stock ownership of 
the corporate complex is so structured as to give to the 
Plaintiff a minority interest in substance as well as in form 
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and that the distribution of ownership and the composition 
of the Board of Directors of the corporate complex has been 
carefully structured to avoid a management deadlock. The 
rule of law stating that closely held corporate stock must 
be appraised at its fair market value as stock, was violated 
by the trial court. (Record 1573-74). The Defendant's deadlock 
theory by which he sought to evade this rule is transparent, 
baseless and entirely unsupported by the evidence. As a result 
of the erroneous valuation of the stock of the three corporations 
that make up the corporate complex, the share of the marital estate 
awarded the Plaintiff was over-valued by as much as Six Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($600,000). 
The Seegmiller property is a 1,181 acre tract of 
arid, sagebrush covered desert, several miles from St. George, 
Utah. As Plaintiff's brief points out, at page 55, the validity 
of any appraised value of this property depends almost entirely 
upon the assumptions made as to the availability and cost of 
water. Without citing the record, the Defendant's brief states 
that her expert witness discounted the value of the property 
for the unavailability of water. This is not true. Her expert 
witness assumed that water was available to the Seegmiller pro-
perty and discounted the value of the property for the cost of 
developing it. The distinction is crucial. If water is not 
available, the Seegmiller property is virtually worthless. The 
Defendant's brief does not dispute that her expert witness was 
ruled incompetent to testify regarding the availability of water, 
nor that the only competent testimony regarding the availability 
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of water was given by the Plaintiff, who, as owner, testified 
that water was not available. By rejecting the Plaintiff's 
competent testimony with respect to the availability of water 
and accepting the incompetent testimony of the Defendant's wit-
ness, the trial court committed reversable error greatly affect-
ing the appraised value of the Seegmiller property. 
With respect to the accuracy of the lower court's 
values, generally, the Defendant's brief states, at page 39: 
...Even though Appellant claims the value 
of Major is grossly exaggerated, the Respondent 
has always been willing to accept the Major 
Enterprises' stock (or for that matter, any 
other asset,) by way of distribution to her at 
values placed by the Court. The Respondent 
has offered and does hereby again offer to 
settle this matter by having awarded to her 
only the residence and stock in Major Enter-
prises. We renew such overture. We are 
confident that Appellant will not accept 
this offer, but Respondent would be pleased 
if he did so. 
The Plaintiff accepts the Defendant's offer to settle this 
matter by transfer of his greatly overvalued stock in Major 
Enterprises subject to the rights of the existing shareholders. 
In the alternative, he agrees to assign his greatly overvalued 
contract receivable from Holidair Lands, Inc. if the Defendant 
will credit its $504,000 appraised value to the amount awarded 
to her under the judgment of the lower court. 
POINT IX 
THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF RELIES UPON MISSTATED FACTS IN 
DENYING THAT THE RIGHTS OF ANY THIRD PARTIES TO THIS LAWSUIT . 
HAVE BEEN ADJUDICATED BY THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT. 
Holidair Lands, Inc. holds title under installment 
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land purchase contracts to the "Sandberg" and "Pershing Nelson11 
properties. The Plaintiff owns 82-1/2% and one Richard Rogers 
owns 17-1/2% of Holidair Land's outstanding shares. Both the 
judgments of November 11, and of December 18, 1974 impose a 
lien in favor of the Defendant as follows: 
A lien in favor of Defendant, Klein, is 
imposed upon the subject real property and the 
contracts to assure the payment of Defendant, 
Klein, of the sum of Six Hundred Dollars 
($600) per acre prior to the sale or use there-
of by Plaintiff, Klein, or Holidair Lands, Inc. 
By the terms of the judgment, then, a lien in favor of the Defen-
dant is imposed not only on the Plaintiff's contract receivable 
from Holidair Lands, which he owns personally, but a lien 
in the amount of Six Hundred Dollars ($600) per acre is 
imposed directly upon the installment land purchase contract 
rights and directly upon the underlying acreage itself. These 
contracts, and the underlying acreage, are owned exclusively 
by Holidair Lands, Inc. The Plaintiff has no personal rights 
whatever in them. The Defendant's brief contends: 
that Holidair Lands, Inc. and its shareholders 
(Appellant and one Rogers) do not acquire any title 
and interest in and to the land itself except only 
from the Appellant, and only at such times as Holidair 
Lands pays to Appellant the sum of $1,200 per acre. 
In support of her interpretation, the Defendant cites the follow-
ing provision in the Option Agreement, dated September 21, 1964 
(Record 51, and Exhibit 6-D): 
The Seller (Plaintiff) shall release one acre 
to be selected.by the Buyer (Holidair Lands, Inc.) 
for each $1,200 paid by the Buyer to the Seller under 
the terms and conditions of this agreement, (Exhibit 
5-D). 
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The Defendant has hopelessly misread this provision of the Option 
Agreement. Under this agreement, the Plaintiff divests himself 
of all right, title and interest to the installment purchase 
contracts and the underlying acreage and Holidair Lands acquires 
all right, title and interest to the installment purchase con-
tracts and underlying acreage. The provision quoted in the 
Defendant's brief refers to the security interest retained by the 
Plaintiff. It is clearly this retained security interest alone 
that the Plaintiff is to release to Holidair Lands upon the 
payment of $1,200 per acre. Holidair Lands acquired the install-
ment land purchase contracts and the underlying acreage upon 
the signing of the Agrement in February, 1971. It does not 
acquire these properties upon payment of $1,200 per acre. 
Rather, it obtains only a release of the Plaintiff's lien upon 
such acreage by the payment of $1,200 per acre. 
The Defendant's contention that Holidair Lands does 
n o t accluire the installment land purchase contract or the under-
lying acreage, except as the Plaintiff releases them, is ground-
less. Therefore, the lien in favor of the Defendant which the 
lower court judgment placed directly upon the installment land 
purchase contracts and directly upon the underlying acreage, 
are liens placed directly upon the assets of Holidair Lands. 
Since Holidair Lands is owned in part by Richard Rogers, a third 
party, his right to said assets has been encumbered by the 
Judgment of the lower court. This directly violates the rule 
of law cited at page 58 of Plaintiff's original brief which 
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forbids a Decree of Divorce- to adjudicate the rights of third 
parties. 
The lower court's Judgment of December 18, 1974, 
required that the Plaintiff's stock in Major Enterprises 
be pledged to the court and sold upon Plaintiff's default in 
retiring the mortgage on the Seegmiller property or failing 
to make installments on the $50,000 awarded to the Defendant. 
The Defendant's brief contends that this requirement does not 
violate the rights of Verl O'Brien as a 501 shareholder of Major 
Enterprises' stock, in the stock owned by the Plaintiff. She 
maintains that the pledge and sale would all be accomplished 
subject to Verl O'Brien's rights. 
The facts are that no stock in Major Enterprises can 
be pledged or sold without violating the restrictions placed 
upon that stock by the Shareholder Agreement received as Exhibit 
40-P during the July, 1974 modification hearings. That Agreement 
forbids the transfer of any Major Enterprises' stock without 
first offering that stock to the corporation itself for thirty 
days at a previously negotiated or an arbitrated price, and, 
thereafter, offering the stock at a pre-negotiated or arbitrated 
price to the corporation's remaining shareholder. It is obvious 
from the restrictions placed upon the Plaintiff's stock by said 
Shareholder Agreement that this Agreement prohibits the pledge 
of Plaintiff's stock to the court or its sale by the court. 
The Defendant states in her brief that the Shareholder 
Agreement referred to above is limited to insurance purposes. 
A reading of the terms of the Shareholders Agreement does not 
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permit the interpretation sought by the Defendant. One provision 
of the Agreement is that the shareholders shall annually negoti-
ate the transfer price of Major Enterprises1 stock. The specific 
values arrived at under this provision were estimations of the 
replacement value of either the Plaintiff or Verl O'Brien upon 
their death rather than estimates of the current market value 
of the shares. (Record 679-80). The Defendant has tried to 
construe such testimony to mean that the Shareholder Agreement 
as a whole was limited to insurance purposes. This interpre-
tation is untenable in view of trhe terms of the Agreement itself 
which comprehensively covers all circumstances under which Major 
Enterprises1 stock might be transferred, specifically including 
such non-death related circumstances as disability, retirement 
and gifts to immediate family members. The rule of law cited 
at page 58 of Plaintiff's brief that a decree of divorce may 
not interfere with or adjudicate the rights of third parties 
will be violated if the Plaintiff's Major Enterprises stock 
is pledged to or sold by the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The core of the argument made in the Defendant's brief 
is that the Plaintiff should not be heard to complain of the 
inequity of the Judgments of the modifying court in view of their 
award to him of approximately two thirds of a correctly valued 
marital estate. This is not the nature of the inequity of which 
Plaintiff most seriously complains. The most serious injustice 
of both lower court Judgments is that they create the extreme 
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risk that virtually all of the marital estate will collapse 
due to a failure to retire the purchase money debt which now 
encumbers it. Both parties will suffer from this injustice. 
Its principal cause is the encumbering and fragmenting of the 
business assets of the marital estate in such a way that they 
cannot be effectively used as collateral or effectively developed. 
There is no other way that the cash needed to preserve this 
estate can be obtained. The lower court Judgments hang over 
this marital estate like the sword of Solomon, primed to divide 
a child in two to appease both mothers, but sacrificing the 
child in the process. 
This injustice to both parties can be effectively 
avoided by a division of the marital property in the form of 
adjustments of the alimony awarded to the Defendant. Such a 
property division would remove the present encumbrances of the 
marital estate's business assets, make them whole again, and 
allow their development to go forward for the benefit of both 
parties. Property divisions in this form are solidly sanctioned 
by precedent where the marital estate includes substantial 
speculative assets. They are especially effective in solving 
the equitable problems arising from estates of this kind. 
If this court does not conclude that such a division 
of property is necessary to avoid manifest injustice to both 
parties, the grave errors committed by the lower court with 
respect to the values of the Plaintiff's corporate complex stock, 
his contract receivables from Holidair Lands and the Seegmiller 
property must be corrected by affording the Plaintiff a new 
trial of those matters. 
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DATED this the day of September, 1975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'" (l VU SypiM'^P- lUdtt' 
Orrin G. Hatch 
Attorney for Appellant 
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APPENDIX A 
FORMAL ACCEPTANCE 
The Defendant, at page 39 of her Brief, has made the 
following settlement offer: 
•••Even though Appellant claims the value of 
Major is grossly exaggerated, the Respondent has 
always been willing to accept the Major Enterprises1 
stock (or for that matter, any other asset,) by way 
of distribution to her at values placed by the Court. 
The Respondent has offered and does hereby again offer 
to settle this matter by having awarded to her only 
the residence and stock in Major Enterprises. We renew 
such overture. We are confident that Appellant will 
\ not accept this offer, but Respondent would be pleased 
if he did so. 
The Plaintiff hereby formally accepts the Defendant's 
offer to settle this matter by transferring his stock in Major 
Enterprises, Inc. to the Defendant, subject to the rights of 
existing shareholders. 
In the alternative, consistent with the Defendant's 
offer to take by way of settlement any marital asset at the value 
assigned to it by the lower court, the Plaintiff agrees to transfer to 
the Defendant his right to his contract receivable from Holidair 
Lands, Inc., valued by the trial court at $504,000. If the Defen-
dant retains her award under the lower court Judgment of the resi-
dence of the parties, valued by the trial court at $103,000, 
$7,000 cash awarded her in lieu of the parties' stock in Inter-
mountain Lands Development Corporation, the seven rental units 
owned by the parties in the St. George Sandpiper apartment com-
plex, given a net value of $16,500 by the trial court, and the 
Willow Creek Country Club membership, valued at $3,500 by the 
App, 1 
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trial court, the Defendant would receive assets by way of dis-
tribution with a total value of $634,000. This exceeds the value 
of the assets awarded to the Defendant by the Judgment of Decem-
ber 18, 1974, which assets had a total value of $625,563.35 
according to the Plaintiff's calculation and $552,563.35 accord-
ing to the Defendant's calculation. The Plaintiff requests that 
this distribution be made and that this matter be disposed of 
accordingly. 
App, 2 
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